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Resumen 
 
El proceso innovador enfrenta una serie de fallos de mercado y por esta razón – y por ser considerado uno de 
los principales agentes del crecimiento económico en el mundo – un significativo número de políticas gu-
bernamentales y supra-nacionales son diseñadas para promover el progreso tecnológico.  En Europa la situa-
ción no podría ser diferente y la “Paradoja Europea” es utilizada como principal argumento para la imple-
mentación de iniciativas relacionadas a la innovación. Junto con estas políticas hay una creciente preocupa-
ción con su continua evaluación, teniendo como objetivo proveer feedbacks para la adaptación y adecuación 
de estos programas con las necesidades de los agentes involucrados. En este sentido, el presente paper desa-
rrolla una evaluación de los impactos del Programa Eureka para el caso de las empresas españolas participan-
tes en esta iniciativa y con proyectos concluidos entre los años 2000-2005 (a través de análisis de los infor-
mes finales de los proyectos). Un total de 77 empresas fueron abordadas con métodos cuantitativos (correla-
ciones, testes chi-cuadrado, análisis discriminante y análisis de cluster). Los resultados demuestran que la 
participación española en Eureka suele tener altos niveles de logros tecnológicos. Los logros comerciales 
parecen estar definidos por la calidad del funcionamiento del proyecto y por la capacidad de las empresas en 
explotar sus resultados en el mercado ya antes del fin del proyecto. Una tipología introductoria de los parti-
cipantes es propuesta en 3 conglomerados: (1) Risky Innovators; (2) Inventors; y (3) Consistent Innovators.  
 
Palabras clave: Políticas de Innovación; Programa Eureka; Sistema de Innovación Español; Colaboración 
en I+D. 
 
Abstract 
 
Innovation is a process that faces several “market failure” situations and for this reason – and for being con-
sidered one of the main drivers of economic growth throughout the world – a large number of governmental 
and supranational policies are designed to foster technological progress. In Europe this situation could not 
be any different and the “European Paradox” is used as the main argument for the implementation of inno-
vation related initiatives. Along with these policies, there is an increasing concern with their continuous 
evaluation aiming at providing valuable feedback for these program’s adaptation and adequacy to the player’s 
needs. In this sense, this paper develops an evaluation of Eureka Programme’s impact for the case of Spanish 
companies participating in this initiative and that had projects finished in the period 2000-2005 (analysis 
performed through the information contained in Eureka’s Final Reports). A total of 77 firms were assessed 
through quantitative methods, namely correlations, chi-square tests, discriminant models and cluster analy-
sis. Findings show that Spain participates in Eureka mainly through SMEs, and that the overall rate of tech-
nological achievements is impressively good. Commercial achievements seem to be influenced mainly by the 
quality of the project’s functioning and the capacity of firm’s exploiting results in the industry by the end of 
the project. A basic typology of participants is offered in which three clusters are built: (1) Risky Innovators; 
(2) Inventors; and (3) Consistent Innovators.     
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1. Introduction 
Innovation policies are a matter of great con-
cern worldwide and in the European Union 
this situation is not different. Much has been 
said about the “European Paradox”, i.e., the 
difference between scientific capabilities and 
actual innovation performance1 (Georghiou, 
2001) and, therefore, several measures took 
place in order to modify this scenario since the 
EU realized that only through innovation a 
dynamic and competitive society could be 
achieved (Hidalgo, León & Pavón, 2002), re-
ducing the gap with its main competitors in 
the global scenario: the US and Japan. 
 
Broadly speaking, these programs that stimu-
late innovative activities take place to correct 
the market failures associated with R&D in-
vestments (Klette, Moen & Griliches, 2000). 
Nonetheless, unsatisfactory results in this area 
are mainly attributed to lack of R&D invest-
ment and to a low productivity of the re-
sources invested (Benfratello & Sembenelli, 
2002) showing a strong need for the analysis, 
evaluation and measurement of current inno-
vation and technological policies2 (Edler, 
2010). But this cannot be regarded as a simple 
task depending solely on recognizing the un-
derlying difficulties and designating funds for 
it. Despite important conceptual and methodo-
logical advances in the economics of science 
and innovation in recent years, there is still 
little agreement as to what ‘good’ science, 
technology and innovation (STI) policy should 
look like and which instruments should be 
used (Laranja, Uyarra & Flanagan, 2007), 
which gives an idea of the complexity involved 
not only in formulating innovation policies, 
but also in evaluating their impact.  
 
What is known is that performance in terms of 
innovation varies greatly amongst the EU’s 
countries, regions, firms and sectors. To ac-
                                                 
1  The Green Paper published in 1995 by the European Commis-
sion is the more broadly known document that tackles this 
situation. It points out that in terms of scientific performance 
the EU stands in an excellent position in comparison to the US 
and Japan but the industrial and commercial performance (and 
its ability of transforming the results of technological research 
and skills into innovations and competitive advantages)  in 
high-technology sectors has deteriorated (European Commis-
sion, 1995).  
2 As a matter of fact, recent studies show that apparently this 
Paradox may be a fallacy since the EU show signs of weakness 
with respect to the generation of both scientific knowledge and 
technological innovation in comparison to the United States and 
Japan and the belief in the “European Paradox” led to policies 
oriented towards innovation and market driven scientific activi-
ties (Dosi, Llerena & Sylos-Labini, 2006).  
 
complish with these differences regional or 
national policies in support of innovation have 
been introduced, starting in the beginning of 
the 80’s (European Commission, 1995). In this 
sense, industrial policies in the European level 
regarding highly competitive sectors such as 
information and communication technologies, 
biotechnology and nanotechnology, require a 
higher level of integration in R&D efforts be-
tween firms and nations in the European Un-
ion (European Commission, 2004). But to 
what extent are the existent policies and inno-
vation programs efficient? Innovation is a tre-
mendously complex process, very hard to 
manage (as it is to measure), but that provides 
extremely relevant results both economically 
and socially. This implies that whichever pol-
icy is developed towards innovative activities 
must be well thought, designed and measured 
so it can be continuously improved and 
adapted to market needs.  
 
Notwithstanding, actual evaluation efforts 
seem to be rather modest compared to the size 
of technological policies (Klette, Moen & 
Griliches, 2000). Another problem is the po-
tential lack of adaptation of the evaluation 
frameworks considering the evolution of inno-
vation itself. Arnold (2004) points out that 
even though theory about research, innovation 
and technological change has evolved to ap-
proaches based on dynamic systems, policies’ 
evaluation systems still work based on an idea 
of direct and simple cause-effect relationships. 
However, approaching this complexity is not a 
feasible task in many situations when struc-
tured data, usual methodologies and deadlines 
do not allow for the evaluator to develop this 
sort of model of analysis. But this does not 
imply that more complex interactions are not 
considered in the evaluation, providing limita-
tions and ideas for the results.  
 
The scope of this paper lies in analyzing tech-
nological and commercial impacts at national 
level (the case of Spanish firms) of one of the 
most relevant technological programs that take 
place in the Europe and that has as its main 
goal fostering innovation through cooperation 
between organizations from different nations: 
the Eureka Programme. The objective is to 
understand the impact of Eureka in the busi-
ness environment through an ex post assess-
ment of its results in a set of companies that 
participated in the program, allowing for a 
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contribution regarding the evaluation of this 
initiative.  
 
One has to be very careful when carrying out 
such an evaluation: effectiveness of techno-
logical policies is a deeply complicated aspect 
to assess. Imagine the situation in which the 
results are highly correlated with initial objec-
tives proposed by firms (or any sort of agents), 
indicating a spectacular rate of success in in-
novation attainment. This would have to be 
addressed very cautiously, considering innova-
tion’s characteristics (specifically the uncer-
tainty of the generation of innovations) – in 
the best scenario, this outcome would be likely 
to represent a large amount of innovations 
without real market relevance.  
 
What is proposed here is a more process-
oriented evaluation of outcomes. This means, 
analyzing the initiative in its internal consis-
tency, most relevant indicators of perform-
ance, how they interact with themselves and 
with companies’ characteristics. The ultimate 
goal of this effort is to provide knowledge on 
drivers of participants’ achievements. It is ex-
pected that this might bring up some impor-
tant insights for agents involved with the in-
novation context related to the Eureka initia-
tive.  
 
The analysis here undertaken is based on a 
quantitative approach of Eureka’s Final Re-
ports of projects completed by Spanish com-
panies during the period 2000-2005. These 
reports are structured in a way that allows for 
the assessment of descriptive information 
(general features of the companies such as size 
and status of participation in the project), gen-
eral impact of the project (technological 
achievements, commercial impact, industrial 
exploitation and employment impact) and 
some additional information regarding com-
panies’ view of Eureka’s main benefits and the 
main obstacles faced during their participa-
tion. Data regarding companies’ main charac-
teristics (more detailed data of size and indus-
trial sector) were also combined with the 
original database to provide a more consistent 
analysis. This specific period was chosen due 
to data availability and consistency of analysis, 
i.e., data for the period 2006-2008 is also 
available, but there has been a change in the 
questionnaire structure, which makes it diffi-
cult a good comparison for firms with projects 
finished after 2005.  
 
In this sense, the methodological approach is 
divided in three parts: descriptive analysis, 
identification of associations and discriminant 
analysis & typology of participants. The de-
scriptive section refers to an in depth analysis 
of the sample composition and the general 
outcomes firms achieved through their par-
ticipation in the Eureka Initiative. When deal-
ing with a country examination this might 
bring some valuable information not only 
about the general profile of Spanish partici-
pants but also regarding their general interac-
tion with Eureka. The identification of associa-
tions consists in the use of correlation coeffi-
cients and cross-tabs (chi-square) to establish 
relationships between variables in the sample 
and, this way, to provide information about 
the dynamics of the companies’ participation 
in the process involved with developing a pro-
ject within the Eureka Programme. The dis-
criminant analysis & typology of participants 
is the last part of this study and it consists in 
the development of discriminant models and 
cluster analysis. The objective is to assess what 
exactly influences both technological and 
commercial results for these firms and how 
they can be grouped according to their charac-
teristics and performance. 
 
The paper begins with a broad analysis of in-
novation policies, its main characteristics and 
goals, as well as some recommendations on its 
evaluations. This is followed by a section that 
deals specifically with cooperative R&D pro-
grams (which is the case of the Eureka initia-
tive). The main features of Eureka are pre-
sented, as well as previous results of evalua-
tions undertaken. Subsequently the methodol-
ogy of the research is presented, introducing 
Eureka’s Final Reports used for the statistical 
analysis and the methodology applied. After, 
results are presented and discussed and we 
finish with some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Innovation Policy: Theory 
and Evaluation 
 
The role that technology plays in the process 
of economic development and growth has 
been widely analyzed and discussed in eco-
nomic theory, as well as its relationship with 
the existent institutional framework (for some 
of the most referenced works in this area see 
Solow, 1956; Arrow, 1962; Arrow et al, 1961; 
Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990 among many oth-
ers). Even though a serious and constructive 
debate remains regarding to what extent and 
how technology change affects economic sys-
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tems, technological innovation policies seem 
to be present in governments’ projects regard-
less of their political inclination or geographi-
cal relevance (national, regional, local or even 
supranational) which is a result of the role that 
innovation and technological change play in 
fostering economic growth and its characteris-
tics of public goods that are likely to create 
market failures (Álvarez, 2004; Molero & Fon-
fría, 2008).  
 
In all important aspects adaptive policy mak-
ing is about facilitation (enabling innovation), 
understanding the existence of unpredictabil-
ity and indeterminacy in the results of policy 
initiatives (Metcalfe & Georghiou, 1997) and 
it is pretty clear that innovation processes hap-
pen in conditions of uncertainty and (in the 
capitalist system) of competition and so must 
be approached in a holistic manner, consider-
ing not only technical capabilities but also the 
market environment and the social context 
(Pavitt, 2003; Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). More 
than that, innovation is also a costly process 
which can create market failures related to 
appropriability, risk, amount of R&D invest-
ment, spillovers and externalities. This justifies 
the need for public policies that approach 
these problems, allowing for an environment 
that better fosters innovative activities 
(Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 2010; Nelson, 
1959; Sanz Menéndez, 1995).   
 
In this sense, globalization and the shift to-
wards knowledge as the source of competi-
tiveness rendered the traditional policy in-
struments less effective (Gilbert, Audretsch & 
McDougall, 2004), creating an environment 
that demands adaptation in public policies and 
initiatives: technology policies are part of a 
complex economic landscape and must ensure 
that the main players, the firms, are able to 
realize their innovative potential (Molero, 
2001), meaning that the appropriate R&D 
policymaking requires knowledge about con-
text conditions, group behavior, instruments 
(and their mix) and policy effects (Ebersber-
ger, Edler & Lo, 2006).  
 
Therefore, since R&D policies can be consid-
ered fundamental for long-term development 
and are subject to an ever-changing environ-
ment, there is a strong need to continuously 
evaluate their effectiveness (Bayona-Sáez & 
García-Marco, 2010). Emphasis should be 
given to policy trials and their evaluation: the 
process of adaptation may consist in trials and 
errors (Metcalfe & Georghiou, 1997) and only 
through frequent assessments there can be 
actual improvements in the process. One ex-
ample of misconceptions regarding innovation 
policies is given by Barañano (1995): Euro-
pean institutions seem to have been providing 
support to those firms that do not actually 
need it, leaving those actually dependent on 
governmental bodies without financial or net-
working support (Barañano, 1995).  
 
While technology programs have focused in-
creasingly in the promotion of innovation 
networks and linkages between innovation 
systems, evaluation methods and approaches 
have been developed to analyze and measure 
the outcomes of such policies, but it seems 
that evaluation of public technology policies 
work has had less of an impact in the literature 
than it deserves (Georghiou & Roessner, 
2000). Research evaluation has been taking 
place in OECD countries since the 1970´s with 
a noticeable increase in the 1980’s – among the 
first to address this activity were the Nordic 
countries (Luukkonen, 2002; Langfeldt, 
2004). Evaluation activities consist basically in 
systematically and objectively determining the 
relevance, efficiency and effect of an activity 
considering its objectives, providing policy-
makers with feedbacks on the impacts of such 
initiatives and creating fundamental knowl-
edge for the promotion of necessary adjust-
ments for future policies’ formulation and im-
plementation (Durieux and Fayl, 1997). In 
addition to the capacity of providing feedback, 
a technological policy evaluation system must 
ensure the periodicity of analysis and guaran-
tee the independence of evaluators (Geor-
ghiou, 1997). This implies the idea of perma-
nent non-biased observation which in theory 
means the possibility of dynamic evolution of 
technological programs, but in reality also 
brings up questions related to the lack of in-
terest of some policymakers in having their 
initiatives criticized – especially when criti-
cisms happen to suggest the termination of a 
particular initiative for its low effectiveness.  
 
But these evaluation activities and the identifi-
cation of policy “best practices” in OECD 
countries is a complicated task given the myr-
iad of technological initiatives that take place 
in these nations (ranging from direct support 
to basic research to more indirect measures 
aimed at improving the capacity of firms to 
innovate and use new technologies) (Durieux 
and Fayl, 1997). This situation highlights the 
importance of specific analyses at both geo-
graphical and industrial levels, since techno-
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logical programs, in order to be successful, 
must fit the characteristics of the environment 
in which they take place.  
 
In the European context this might represent 
some extra challenges for policymakers – 
promotion of bloc-wide policies must regard 
the idiosyncrasies of Member States in order to 
be fully effective. Again, it is important to re-
mind that the effectiveness of innovation poli-
cies in general has to be carefully regarded. 
The simple input-output analysis (the famous 
linear model) does not necessarily allow the 
evaluator or researcher to assess innovation 
impacts thoroughly – For example, 
Luukkonen (2002) points out that there is 
skepticism towards the validity of many 
evaluation measurements due to difficulties in 
attributing impact to particular initiatives and 
lags between the time in which a project was 
undertaken and the time when the results 
arise. Also, a high rate of innovation projects’ 
success may indicate not that the initiative is a 
sounding triumph, but that the data is not 
reliable or worse: the projects undertaken are 
not ambitious enough and deal more with 
mere improvements in products and processes 
than with groundbreaking innovations per se.  
 
Some of the most well-known methods for 
innovation policy evaluation consist of inde-
pendent expert panels, interviews, use of ques-
tionnaires, surveys, core indicators, case stud-
ies and micro-level econometric analysis – the 
use of these methods depend on what kind of 
program is being evaluated (Durieux and Fayl, 
1997; Grupp, 2000). Like science in general, 
evaluation of technological policies faces an 
inevitable dualism between quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Basically the distinc-
tion is made depending on the objective 
planned for the analysis: quantitative methods 
are focused on measurement of socioeconomic 
impacts and qualitative ones regard the evalua-
tion of strategic importance of activities 
(Luukkonen, 2002). Technically, this situation 
means that the relationship between both ap-
proaches is complementary (Durieux and Fayl, 
1997). Roessner (2000) points that any pro-
posed opposition between quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation methods is a fallacy – 
the adequate methodological design must con-
sider the objectives of the evaluation. The 
Eureka initiative, giving an example related to 
the scope of this article, carries out both quan-
titative and qualitative analysis, providing sta-
tistics on its impact and also a series of repre-
sentative case studies3.  
 
Turning to a more theoretical approach, evolu-
tionary economic theory influenced techno-
logical policies to become more oriented to 
adaptation of firms and markets in an envi-
ronment of change (Nelson & Winter, 2002), 
providing the framework for a concern of the 
own system’s changes over time. We can af-
firm then that existing institutional structures, 
including bodies of relevant law, and particu-
lar government policies and programs, never 
can be regarded as optimal and for this reason 
they are, and should be, always subject to 
evaluations and constructive criticism (Nelson, 
2007). But it is important to recognize some 
improvements in the conception of innovation 
policies. In the European Union, until the 
1990s, the complexity of research activities 
and knowledge creation preceding the intro-
duction of an innovation as well as the interac-
tion between suppliers and users were largely 
ignored (Pianta & Vaona, 2009).  
 
Technological policy reforms, however, are 
needed for Europe to become a more research-
friendly area (Georghiou, 2008). In the 1980s 
the main challenge for European companies 
was, in face of globalization, to move from a 
national to a continental scale (Georghiou, 
2001) and currently a pan-European policy 
that maximizes the bloc’s competitiveness in 
crucial industries and coordinates R&D efforts 
between national innovation systems is the 
main goal (Álvarez, 2004)4. This search for 
coordination and interaction between different 
innovation systems can be achieved through 
the promotion of R&D cooperation between 
agents (research centers, firms, etc.), which is 
the case of the Eureka Programme (a full de-
scription of this initiative’s characteristics is 
provided later on in section 4.).  
 
                                                 
3 Nonetheless, and setting the stage for the analysis to follow, we 
would like to remind that this article has a quantitative focus, 
which makes sense according to literature since it assesses 
technological and commercial impacts. 
4 Another fundamental focus should be given to market orienta-
tion of R&D output, since innovation depends not only on 
technical capabilities or network coordination: it must be suc-
cessfully marketable (Lukas & Ferrell, 2000; Hidalgo, León & 
Pavón, 2002). On the other hand, Atuahene-Gima (1996) pre-
sents results that do not support the hypothesis that market 
orientation causes performance improvements regarding innova-
tions. 
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3. International R&D  
Cooperation 
 
All indicators, such as co-publications, co-
inventions, and joint research projects, point 
in the direction of an increasing relevance of 
international collaboration in science and 
technology which is followed by a significant 
increase and broadening of international and 
transnational policy initiative and instruments 
to foster and shape international S&T collabo-
ration (Edler, 2010).  
 
History shows that R&D partnerships have 
been growing since the 1960s with a notice-
able acceleration in the 1980s. This is the re-
sult of the increasing level of complexity of 
R&D projects in recent years, higher uncer-
tainty surrounding R&D, increasing costs of 
R&D projects, stronger competition and 
shortened innovation cycles that favor collabo-
ration in face of an environment with more 
specialized organizations in terms of knowl-
edge production (Pavitt, 2002; Hagedoorn, 
2002; Narula, 2001; Zeng, Xie & Tam, 2010; 
Barajas & Huergo, 2006; Katz & Martin, 
1997)5. Other benefits from cooperative R&D 
come from the assumption that it increases the 
efficiency of R&D efforts, provides more flexi-
bility to adapt to technological changes and 
eliminates wasteful duplication; also coopera-
tive R&D agreement may serve as a mecha-
nism that internalizes the externalities created 
by spillovers while continuing the efficient 
sharing of information (Katz, 1986; Hidalgo, 
León & Pavón, 2002). Moreover, the process 
of globalization itself has influenced firms’ 
behavior and technological characteristics of 
innovations by increasing outsourcing and 
strategic alliances and also by promoting in-
creasingly multi-technological products (Na-
rula, 2004).  
 
As a consequence of these trends there is an 
emergence of new forms of interaction be-
tween firms (Wagner & Edelmann, 2002), 
fostering an environment of “open innova-
tion”, meaning that many companies across 
industries externalize several R&D activities, 
focusing on their core competences and ab-
sorbing third parties’ capabilities. This implies 
that firms use R&D partnerships to access 
                                                 
5 Nelson (1959) mentions that the lack of incentives for 
individual firms to invest in new knowledge (due to mainly 
appropriability problems) was managed by many industries via 
the establishment of cooperative research organizations.  
 
knowledge, expertise or skills and build global 
R&D networks, being the choice of partners 
dictated by the complementary resources 
which the counterpart controls, allowing com-
panies to improve their performance (Miotti & 
Sachwald, 2003; Georghiou, 1998; Nesta & 
Mangematin, 2004). One significant outcome 
of this scenario is that especially large compa-
nies are likely to become less self-sufficient in 
their processes, being able to incur in the divi-
sion of innovative activities (Pavitt, 2003; 
Fritsch & Lukas, 2001) which according to 
economic theory should lead to scale econo-
mies6.  
 
Efforts on R&D cooperation are especially 
relevant in OECD countries, where the in-
creasing number of R&D strategic alliances 
stands for a new organization in industrial 
technological structure focused on network 
promotion policies instead of direct financial 
assistance policies (De Jong & Freel, 2010; 
Hidalgo, León & Pavón, 2002). This interest 
from governments in promoting international 
research collaboration comes primarily from 
expectations of cost savings and other related 
benefits (Katz & Martin, 1997). Cooperative 
R&D policies gain even more importance 
when one considers that the extent to which a 
country’s businesses, institutions and indus-
tries are linked with resources and capabilities 
located outside the country is likely to posi-
tively impact on the innovation performance 
of that country (European Commission, 
2010), creating local externalities from global 
relationships.  
 
Also, the idea of international scientific and 
technological cooperation can be regarded as 
fundamental for the development of products 
that demand joint R&D due to specialization 
patterns in different economies or regions, i.e., 
the idea of complementarities between firms 
should also be considered as promoting inte-
gration between technically and economically 
heterogeneous territories. In this sense, col-
laboration fosters knowledge transfer in a con-
text of international economics. Narula and 
Santangelo (2009) hypothesize that R&D alli-
ances might even act as a substitute for collo-
cation, or as a complementary mechanism for 
it, clearly embedding the idea of international 
R&D cooperation in the economic geography 
                                                 
6 This does not mean at all that R&D cooperation has no effect 
on SMEs. The point to be noticed here is that smaller firms are 
not likely to proceed to internalization of processes in the first 
place, making them more prone to outsourcing by their own 
organizational definition.  
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framework. 
 
In Europe, the creation of the European Re-
search Area stands for a coordination of closer 
R&D cooperation between organizations of 
EU’s Member States (Georghiou, 2001). As it 
was mentioned in the previous section, it is 
interesting to highlight the adaptive role of the 
policies in this field – R&D cooperation did 
not follow governmental initiatives but the 
other way around. Also, An evaluation under-
took by the European Technology Assessment 
Network (ETAN, 1998) concludes that Euro-
pean firms not only have a internationalized 
S&T profile, but are also increasing its techno-
logical alliances and international generation 
of innovations within Europe and beyond.  
 
However, this growing interest in technologi-
cal cooperation analysis is followed by a high 
level of complexity involved in studying it 
(Barajas & Huergo, 2006). Some models were 
developed in the past decade trying to cope 
with non-linear and non-direct relationships 
between the variables used in the evaluation. 
Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998) wrote 
the most influent article in this sense – they 
approach this idea of complex interrelations 
with a model of simultaneous structural equa-
tions that allow for the analysis of indirect 
relationships (a similar approach has been 
undertook recently by Bogliacino & Pianta, 
2010). Their results show that technological 
cooperation agreements have a positive effect 
in the achievement of innovations which leads 
to better economic outcomes, suggesting an 
indirect relationship between cooperation and 
economic performance via innovations. Simi-
lar results are found by Surroca Aguilar and 
Santamaría Sánchez (2006).  
 
Conceptually, cooperative R&D consists of an 
arrangement among firms aiming at sharing 
costs and results of an R&D project and can be 
achieved through R&D contracts, consortia or 
Research Joint Ventures (Sakakibara, 1997)7. 
The idea of open innovation formalizes the 
importance of these networking initiatives and 
absorptive capacity while reducing the focus 
on internalization of R&D activities (De Jong 
& Freel, 2010). As a matter of fact, external 
sources of knowledge and skills play an in-
creasingly important role in innovation and 
the capacity of accessing and exploring this 
                                                 
7 The kind of cooperative agreement in which firms engage is 
largely determined by technological characteristics and sectors 
of industry (Hagedoorn & Narula, 1996).  
knowledge is fundamental for companies’ 
competitiveness in the described context 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Also, an impor-
tant prerequisite to manage the permanently 
changing dynamic market requirements and to 
secure the competitiveness is the linking and 
cooperation of companies (Wagner & Edel-
mann, 2002).  
 
In an environment of constant technological 
change and high levels of R&D complexity, 
the best way to minimize risks and achieve 
sustainable competitiveness seems to be 
through extreme specialization. It is impossi-
ble to imagine that this trend leads to eco-
nomic growth if firms and agents do not inter-
act with themselves (since they are all deeply 
specialized) or do not even have the capacity 
to do so. R&D cooperation practices have a 
twofold impact in this sense: on the one hand 
they create the possibility of firms addressing 
complexity in a multi-capability and multidis-
ciplinary manner, promoting valuable innova-
tions; on the other hand, R&D cooperation 
increases absorptive capacity and learning 
capabilities in the company, generating better 
prospects for future collaboration. This latter 
aspect is also pointed out by Barañano (1995). 
Therefore, promoting the strengthening of 
companies’ technological skills through col-
laboration and therefore providing them with 
absorptive capacities is a fundamental focus 
that technological policies must consider 
(Molero, 2001; Hidalgo, León & Pavón, 2002; 
Luukkonen, 1998)8. 
 
But it is important to highlight that despite the 
increasing relevance of R&D cooperation and 
the growing literature about it in both the 
fields of management and industrial econom-
ics, there is little evidence on the performance 
effect coming from R&D collaboration 
(Belderbos, Carree & Lokshin, 2004). How-
ever, available analyses at the firm level show 
positive results. Zeng, Xie & Tam (2010) re-
port that interfirm cooperation shows a sig-
nificant positive impact on the innovation 
performance of SMEs in the Chinese environ-
ment. International R&D collaboration also 
seems to be positively associated with higher 
innovation expenditures (De Jong & Freel, 
2010) and to provide firms with strategic 
flexibility to undertake short-term innovation 
projects with a variety of partners (Hagedoorn, 
2002). 
                                                 
8 Hidalgo, León & Pavón, 2002 relate this aspect especially to 
SMEs.  
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Cooperative R&D structures can be seen as 
innovative per se as it creates a new institu-
tional framework for companies cooperate in 
the generation of technological change. Poli-
cies fostering cooperation also show adaptive 
characteristics since they cannot be regarded 
as linear: they promote a more complex and 
holistic approach to innovative processes in 
opposition of direct funding initiatives. But 
one has to be very careful when analyzing col-
laborative R&D and its related initiatives. For 
many sectors, cooperation regarding innova-
tion may be too dangerous for companies’ ap-
propriability strategies – as it is the case of the 
pharmaceutical sector which relies deeply on 
the launching of new products and in the in-
tellectual property rights of these new drugs – 
sharing valuable information with competitors 
or even with agents from industries not di-
rectly related to the pharmaceutical sector 
might be too big of a threat for this organiza-
tions (which explains why this market is con-
trolled by huge corporations with high degrees 
of internalization).  
 
Also, cooperation may happen in different 
stages of R&D. Some projects are related to 
basic R&D, others to pre-competitive activities 
and lastly (as it is the case of the Eureka Initia-
tive), close-to-market cooperation (the one 
which poses the biggest risks for companies). 
Conceptually, R&D alliances can be distin-
guished from production-based alliances in 
terms of its fixed-term horizon and the fact 
that it covers only a small part of the value-
adding activities of companies (Narula, 1999). 
So as it can be noticed, collaboration in the 
area of innovation can not only take different 
shapes in the interorganizational relationship 
(contracts, research joint ventures, etc.) but 
can also apply to R&D activities with different 
purposes. When dealing with evaluation of 
technological policies one cannot neglect these 
aspects.   
 
4. The Eureka Programme: an 
overview 
 
The Eureka Programme emerged as part of a 
concerted effort to bridge the widening tech-
nological gap observed since the 1960s be-
tween Europe and its global competitors: no-
tably the USA and Japan (Eureka Secretariat, 
2005). It was created in 1985 by a French ini-
tiative as a complementary structure for the 
Framework Programmes9 aiming at enhancing 
collaboration between companies in a market 
oriented, non-bureaucratic, bottom-up ap-
proach promoting cooperative projects for 
national funding (León, 2006; Hidalgo, León 
& Pavón, 2002; Stubbs, 2001; Georghiou, 
2001; Marín.& Siotis, 2008).  
 
It became a Europe-wide network that aims at 
increasing its participant’s competitiveness 
through the promotion of cross-border ``mar-
ket-driven'' R&D projects in which firms may 
seek entry for any projects that meet the broad 
criterion of developing advanced technology 
with a market orientation (Georghiou & 
Roessner, 2000; Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco, 
2010; Trabada, 2000; Molero & Fonfría, 2008; 
Marín.& Siotis, 2008). It is important also to 
highlight the relevance of the bottom-up ap-
proach of this initiative: unlike programs that 
have clearly defined areas of interest for R&D 
projects, in Eureka, the nature and scope of 
proposals is defined by the proponents them-
selves.  
 
Eureka is present in 38 countries plus the 
European Commission and acts not through 
financial support but providing projects with a 
seal of approval that facilitates access to gov-
ernmental funds in the national level as well as 
support in finding funding opportunities 
which makes it a fairly decentralized program 
(Molero, 2001; León, 2006; Hidalgo, León & 
Pavón, 2002; Stubbs, 2001; Georghiou & 
Roessner, 2000). Even though Eureka does not 
entitle firms to EU subsidies (it should be 
noted that Eureka is not an EU program), ob-
taining the Eureka “seal of approval” enhances 
firms’ ability to receive support from their 
respective national authorities (Marín & Siotis, 
2008). By conferring an objective seal of qual-
ity on a project, EUREKA labeling greatly aids 
the process of negotiation with public sources 
of finance10. Many member countries accord 
preferential treatment to labeled proposals by 
giving access to specifically reserved funding 
(Eureka Secretariat, 2005). 
 
                                                 
9 Eureka has a “nearer to the market” position relative to the 
Framework Programme even though some level of overlapping 
exists (Georghiou, 2001). It is important noticing, though, that 
Eureka is not part of the Framework Programme or a European 
Union body.  
10 Edler (2007) points the importance of signalling policies 
regarding innovations and there are several other authors that 
analyze signaling strategies and adverse selection risks in the 
context of R&D and innovation funding. For examples see 
Beatty, Berger & Magliolo, 1995; Takalo & Tanayama, 2010; 
Plehn-Dujowich, 2009; Janney & Folta, 2003; Bagella & Bec-
chetti, 1998.  
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Eureka’s focus is on improving European 
competitiveness and productivity through an 
enhanced cooperation between companies and 
research centers in high-tech areas (Molero, 
2001). Under Eureka, cooperation often con-
sists of occasional meetings between firms at 
which information is shared (Fölster, 1995), 
but more formal ways of cooperation also take 
place11.  
 
GSM mobile technology, car-navigation sys-
tems, smartcards to support mobile and elec-
tronic commerce, special effects software for 
cinema, state-of-the-art medical devices and 
technologies to monitor and limit environ-
mental pollution are some of Eureka’s previous 
projects (Eureka Secretariat, 2008)12.  
 
Eureka carries out its own evaluation system 
through periodic reviews. In its first decade of 
existence, evaluations of projects were respon-
sibility of the Member State holding the Chair 
for that year and in 1992-1993 Eureka had its 
first major evaluation, involving teams from 14 
countries working together and carrying out a 
survey with all of the participants13 (Georghiou 
& Roessner, 2000).  
 
However, besides its internal evaluations, 
Eureka is the focus of several academic analy-
ses. Some examples:  
 
a) Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco 
(2010) demonstrate that participation 
in a Eureka Programme has a positive 
effect on firm’s performance both in 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
sectors14 (which is in accordance with 
Benfratello & Sembenelli, 2002 results 
– they also highlight an increase in la-
bor productivity and price-cost mar-
gins for participants);  
 
b) Barañano (1995) suggests that Span-
ish Eureka participants see the im-
provement of the organization’s public 
image as one of the most important 
features of the program;  
                                                 
11 Companies can participate in projects with different goals: end 
users of resulting technology, producers, research institution, 
supplier, other non-specified roles or even multiple roles – also 
firms are defined as the main agent of the cooperation or as 
partner.   
12 It is important to remind that Eureka does not focus on a 
particular set of technologies (Marín & Siotis, 2008).  
13  This evaluation influenced the very evaluation traditions in 
Europe according to Luukkonen (2002).   
14 They also find that there is a 1-year lag between project com-
pletion and performance improvements (Bayona-Sáez & García-
Marco, 2007). 
c) Marín and Siotis (2008) result’s tell 
that it seems that Eureka serves the 
purpose for which it was designed, 
namely to correct the market failures 
associated with the generation of eco-
nomically valuable knowledge;  
 
d) Fölster (1995) hypothesizes that, 
given that Eureka projects require co-
operation but do not require result-
sharing agreements, the likelihood of 
cooperation is not increased while do 
promote incentives to conduct R&D to 
the same extent as subsidies that do 
not require cooperation;  
 
e) Georghiou (2001) points that 
Eureka started with major projects but 
a decline since then took part driven 
by its divergence with national innova-
tion policies.  
 
So as it can be noticed, Eureka is a relevant 
target of innovation policy evaluation. But it is 
important to take into account that even 
though the results presented are mainly posi-
tive, continuous assessments and even differ-
ent research foci might not only identify weak-
nesses of the program, but also provide infor-
mation necessary for adaptations and changes 
in the initiative’s characteristics.   
 
5. Methodology 
 
The methodology developed in this paper has 
a quantitative focus divided into 3 parts: de-
scriptive statistics, identification of associa-
tions and discriminant analysis & typology 
of participants.  The descriptive statistics 
aim at creating a profile of the samples used, 
thus generating some insights on the subjects 
of the analysis and building general knowledge 
on the database. For the Identification of 
associations we use mainly correlations and 
cross-tabs. The goal here is to search for trends 
and significant associations that allow for 
some conclusions about the sample. The dis-
criminant analysis & typology of partici-
pants part is approached with both discrimi-
nant analysis and cluster analysis. The inten-
tion in this part is to verify influential variables 
in the achievements of companies as well as 
identify latent groups within the sample and 
what are their main characteristics.  
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5.1 THE SAMPLE 
 
The sample consists in a subset of Eureka’s 
database of Spanish participants in the initia-
tive for the period 2000-2005. However, some 
adjustments had to be made for this database 
(consisting originally of 330 observations). 
The selection of this specific period is mainly 
due to both data availability and comparison 
issues. The available datasets comprehended 
the perioda 2000-2005 and 2006-2008. This 
discrimination occurs because of a change in 
the structure of Final Reports, thus hampering 
the possibility of organizing a joint analysis. 
Future developments of this research contem-
plate using the 2006-2008 dataset as a control 
sample for the results presented in this docu-
ment.  
 
Thus, the first stage consisted in three steps: 
 
1. Eliminating participants that did not 
respond the Final Report since infor-
mation regarding their participation in 
the Eureka project was not available.  
 
2. Selecting those participants which 
were either Large Companies or Small 
and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) 
given the scope of the analysis. Re-
search Centers, Universities and other 
institutions were then dropped from 
the database.  
  
3. For those participants with more 
than one project, a new observation 
was created based in the combination 
of answers of the distinct projects of 
the same organization which replaced 
the original observations. The original 
observations were dropped from the 
database15.  
 
After these adjustments the 2000-2005 data-
base was left with 77 firms. A last effort was 
made to categorize companies according to 
their sector (NACE 2 digit Rev. 2) using the 
Amadeus database and to identify actual num-
ber of employees: 2 companies from the 2000-
2005 subset could not be classified in this re-
gard.  
 
5.2 VARIABLES OF ANALYSIS 
 
This section consists in an analysis of Eureka’s 
                                                 
15 This procedure allows for an analysis at the company level 
rather than working with results from specific projects.  
Final Reports for the period 2000-2005. This 
does not mean that the projects were under-
taken within this time frame since it refers to 
the date of completion of the projects. From 
this analysis we gathered the most relevant to 
use as variables in the statistical approaches 
developed16. Those items that are in the Final 
Reports’ structure but are not in the scope of 
this article were omitted.  
 
According to the basic structure of Eureka’s 
Final Reports, the questions are gathered into 
groups. Trying to respect this organization of 
data we present the variables in their original 
groups (groups not used are excluded).  
 
a) Organization description – refers 
to aspects as size and sector of the or-
ganization. It is used in this study as a 
mean of obtaining characteristics of 
the sample.  
 
b) Participation in the Project – It as-
sesses the role of the company in the 
project (Producer, End User, Supplier, 
Research or Other17) and if the com-
pany is a Main player in the project or 
a Partner. Also, the functioning of the 
project (1=Excellent; 2=Good; 
3=Weak; 4=Bad), duration (in months) 
and total cost (in million ) were as-
sessed.  
 
c) Technological Achievements – 
Consists of a general overview of re-
sults (1=Excellent; 2=Good; 3=Weak; 
4=Bad) and a more detailed part in 
which a group of indicators is analyzed 
regarding Initial Objectives, Achieved 
and Expected within three years. The 
indicators are: 
  
• New products; 
• Improvements to existing 
products; 
• New processes; 
• Improvements to existing 
processes; 
• Demonstrators, prototypes 
or pilot phase; 
• New licenses; 
• New patents; 
                                                 
16  Further information regarding the variables used in the analy-
sis is provided in Appendix I. Variables of Analysis.  
17 For the purposes of this analysis, whenever a company re-
sponded that it had more than one role in the project it was 
defined as having Multiple Roles.  
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• Publications; 
• Improved/new knowledge 
or skills; 
• Improved manage-
ment/quality of work; 
• New (or improved) strategic 
industrial alliances; 
• New services.  
 
d) Industrial exploitation – It gathers 
information regarding expected indus-
trial exploitation as a result of the pro-
ject (by the company, by another com-
pany or no industrial exploitation). 
Also, it was assessed if results from the 
project were Already on the Market.  
 
e) Commercial Impact: Commercial 
impact is assessed with a general over-
view on this matter (1=Excellent; 
2=Good; 3=Weak; 4=Bad; 5=Nil).  
 
f) Employment Impact – It assesses 
increase in employment (inside and 
outside the company), generation of 
safeguards and absence of employment 
effects. The 2000-2005 questionnaire 
also approaches the possibility of em-
ployment decrease.  
 
g) Eureka Benefits –It consists in 
questions regarding aspects related to 
Eureka’s support, features and charac-
teristics that motivated the company to 
relate the project to this institution.  
 
h) Main Obstacles – It basically con-
sists in assessing the companies’ main 
obstacles from a set of potential prob-
lems participants may have had.  
 
From this description of the constructs from 
Eureka´s Final Reports a basic distinction of 
the variables can be made. This division into 
different constructs allows for a more struc-
tured interpretation of statistical results:  
 
1. Technological Achievements, In-
dustrial Exploitation, Commercial 
Impact and Employment Impact are 
impact constructs and represent re-
sults from the project.  
 
2. Organization Description, Partici-
pation in the Project and Financing 
are descriptive variables and allow for 
a categorization of the participants and 
description of the sample composition.  
 
3. Eureka Benefits and Main Obsta-
cles provide some supplementary in-
formation and are defined as support 
variables.  
 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The Descriptive Statistics in this analysis have 
an exploratory character regarding the data-
base, thus providing some insights on the par-
ticipants and their interaction with Eureka’s 
projects. Frequency statistics are developed for 
the three constructs of analysis. Some cross-
frequencies are developed for descriptive 
variables, trying to identify how different sorts 
of companies (e.g. Large Companies or SMEs) 
participate in Eureka (e.g. their Role in the 
project). Information about the pattern of 
firms participating in Eureka regarding their 
specific sector is also offered.  
 
The descriptive analysis of impact variables 
allow for a general idea of Spanish firm’s 
achievements when participating in this initia-
tive for each of the variables approached. The 
support variables’ analysis provides informa-
tion on companies’ consideration about bene-
fits originated from their participation in a 
Eureka Project and the main obstacles faced.  
Lastly, a compilation of descriptive statistics is 
compared to data from the whole set of par-
ticipants in Eureka’s projects extracted from 
the 2005-2006 Annual Impact Report of 
Eureka.  
 
5.4 IDENTIFICATION OF ASSOCIATIONS 
 
The statistical methods for the identification 
and analysis of associations between variables 
are correlation coefficients and cross-tab 
analysis chi-square tests). The correlation coef-
ficients provide some further exploratory in-
formation in addition to those achieved 
through the descriptive approach. Cross-tab 
analysis with chi-square tests already repre-
sents a step ahead in the identification of asso-
ciations, allowing for some inferential proposi-
tions. The approach described in this section is 
developed according to the following struc-
ture: 
 
1. Correlation coefficients: 
 
a. Within constructs – it is analyzed 
if whether variables are associated with 
other variables in the same construct. 
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For impact variables the relationship 
between Initial Objectives, Achieve-
ments and Expected Results (Techno-
logical Achievements group) is ana-
lyzed, searching for a proxy of the rate 
of success in the projects.  
 
2. Cross-tabs:  
 
a. Between constructs – descriptive 
variables are analyzed according to 
impact variables. The objective of 
this approach is to generate some 
knowledge on how variables such 
as company’s size and its role in 
the project interact with the results 
achieved.  
 
It is worth noticing that statistical interactions 
proposed in this section obey logical and theo-
retical propositions. When analyzing impact 
variables, it is relevant for the study of innova-
tion aspects to relate it to variables represent-
ing companies’ size and their role in the tech-
nological project, as well as how technological 
achievements may influence commercial re-
sults, for example. Working with this set of 
Spanish companies we can, through this spe-
cific methodology described in this section, be 
able to identify some valuable trends in the 
sample.  
 
5.5 DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS & TYPOLOGY 
OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
The discriminant analysis & typology of par-
ticipants approach of this study consists in 
evaluating through statistical methods how the 
companies behave according to their charac-
teristics and outcomes from their participation 
in the project. In a first moment, discriminant 
analysis is performed in an attempt to identify 
how a set of variables determine firms’ techno-
logical and commercial results. The second 
step undertaken is a cluster analysis that aims 
at verifying latent groups of companies with 
similar profiles either regarding their structure 
(size for example) or the impact of their par-
ticipation in Eureka.  More than the previously 
mentioned approaches, this part of the re-
search undertaken aims at generating in-depth 
knowledge on aspects that might contribute 
for the policy-making process at the Eureka 
(and maybe other similar initiatives) level.  
 
The discriminant analysis is developed in a 
two stages structure. In the first model Tech-
nological Achievements (see Appendix I. Vari-
ables of analysis) is taken as the dependent   
variable. The idea is to assess which other 
variables influence in the generation of inno-
vations. Therefore, the following variables are 
included in the model: Companies’ Size, Role 
in the Project18 and Functioning of the Project.  
The second discriminant model is oriented 
towards a performance view of the participa-
tion in the project. Thus, the dependent vari-
able is Commercial Achievements19 and the set 
of independent variables included compre-
hends Companies’ Size, Role in the Project, 
Functioning of the Project, Product Already on 
the Market, Industrial Exploitation by the Re-
spondent’s Company and Overall Technologi-
cal Achievements (now considered as inde-
pendent variable). The idea of these two mod-
els is quite simple: assess the main drivers of 
technological evolution for Spanish companies 
participating in Eureka with projects com-
pleted in the period 2000-2005 and develop an 
introductory knowledge about what affects 
their outcomes from a market-oriented per-
spective. Both models are analyzed in a step-
wise way, aiming at identifying the most rele-
vant explanatory variables for technological 
and commercial impacts of Eureka without 
running the risk of building an unstable model 
(considering the relatively small number of 
observations). 
 
The cluster analysis developed in this paper 
has a rather exploratory character – instead of 
a confirmatory one. The objective is to provide 
some insights on a preliminary typology of 
Spanish participants in the Eureka Initiative 
based on a set of descriptive and impact vari-
ables. For this approach, the TwoStep Cluster 
(SPSS) method was used – this method is an 
exploratory tool designed to reveal natural 
clusters in the dataset according to the pa-
rameters indicated. As auxiliary tests showed, 
the TwoStep Cluster method performs better 
than the K-means method – the Hierarchical 
method was also tested but its results did not 
seem to be analyzable. The Ratio of Schwarz’s 
Bayesian Criterion (BIC) Changes was the test 
used for establishing the optimal number of 
clusters for the sample. Chi-square tests for 
the classification relevance of variables were 
                                                 
18 This includes two variables: one referring to the role of the 
firm as Producer, End user, Supplier, Research, Other or Multi-
ple roles and the other referring to the company as a Main 
player or Partner in the project.  
19  As it can be seen in Appendix I. Variables of Analysis, the 
commercial achievements variable can have the values: 0=no 
answer; 1=excellent; 2=good; 3=weak; 4=bad; 5=nil. For consis-
tency of this analysis the cases listed as “no answer” were 
dropped (2 observations).   
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also performed.  
 
The specific variables included in the settings 
of the cluster are: Companies’ Size, Role in the 
Project (as Main player or Partner and as Pro-
ducer, End user, Supplier, Research, Other or 
Multiple), Functioning of the Project, Overall 
Technological Achievements, Industrial Ex-
ploitation by the Respondent’s Company, 
Product Already on the Market and Commer-
cial Achievements.  
 
6. Results 
 
This section brings the results of the analysis 
performed. Sections follow the same order as 
they are explained in the methodology section: 
Descriptive statistics of the sample are pro-
vided together with some graphs, the identifi-
cation of associations is presented in two parts 
– first the correlation coefficients are exposed 
and discussed followed by the cross-tabs (chi-
square) – and lastly we offer both the dis-
criminant and cluster analysis’ results.  
 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In Graph 2 companies are firstly described 
according to their broad sector of activity. It 
can be noticed that the majority of Spanish 
firms participating in Eureka are either in the 
manufacturing sector (46%) or Services indus-
try (35%). Furthermore, analyzing this distri-
bution and relating it to firms’ sizes, the sam-
ple is composed by a majority of SMEs in 
 
comparison to Large Companies (even though 
organizations in the Primary Sector and Water, 
Energy and Construction are mainly Large 
Companies). In the detailed analysis of com-
panies’ sizes (by number of employees), there 
is a strong concentration of firms with less 
than 50 employees indicating that not only 
SMEs are in bigger number, but that there is a 
relevant representation of purely Small com-
panies. Still in Graph 2 the distribution of 
companies according to their broad sector of 
activity and Role in the Project is provided and 
it should be noticed that mainly firms from the 
sample interact with Eureka as Producers of 
Technology, End Users or with Multiple roles. 
In accordance with the characteristics of the 
sample described above, these roles are mainly 
played by manufactures or service firms.  
 
Graph 3 brings a more detailed industrial 
analysis of the sample (NACE 2 digit Rev. 2). 
There is a myriad of different sectors of activ-
ity when participants are analyzed in this sense 
(32 sectors for 77 firms) which complicates 
any analysis of this approach. However, there 
is a slight predominance of agrifood related 
industries - this can be drawn from the fact 
that 11.7% of firms are manufactures of food 
products (the biggest participation by one 
single sector), 6.5% are in the crop and animal 
production sector and 2.6% in the fishing and 
aquaculture industry. This accounts for nearly 
20% of the sample and suggests some interest-
ing insights on profile of Spanish companies 
participating in Eureka. 
Graph 2. Sample Composition  
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Graph 3. Sample’s sector classification 
 
Table 1 provides information on two aspects of 
Eureka projects’ undertaken by Spanish com-
panies and finished in the period 2000-2005. 
Regarding total cost of projects, the mean is 
3.11 million euro with a standard deviation of 
nearly 5 million euro. As for duration of pro-
jects, they vary between 1 and 8 years with a 
mean of nearly 2 and a half years and a stan-
dard deviation of 15.61 months.  
 
 
In Graph 4 a general overview of companies’ 
results is offered. As it can be seen, most com-
panies regard their participation as being tech-
nologically satisfactory – 92% of firms say that 
their overall technological achievements are 
either excellent or good. It is worth noticing 
that while 8% of firms assess the technological 
impact of the initiative as weak, none has re-
sponded that they were bad. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting analyzing that firms’ vision towards 
commercial achievements is not as optimistic 
as the one regarding the technological 
achievements. Even though the majority of 
firms interpreted the commercial outcome of 
their participation in Eureka as being excellent 
or good - 53% - there is now a clear division 
since 44% responded that they had weak, bad 
or nil (the latter accounting for 16% of the 
 
 
respondents) commercial impacts20. When 
analyzing the expectations of participation’s 
impact in future turnover respondents seem to 
be slightly inclined to a conservative view – 
38% believe the impacts will be of a medium 
level and 25% preferred believe they are going 
to be small.  
                                                 
20 3% of participants did not respond this question.  
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Manufacture of beverages
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery
and equipment
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
Manufacture of other transport equipment
Manufacture of other non‐metallic mineral products
Manufacture of paper and paper products
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Other manufacturing
Crop and animal production, hunting and related service
activities
Fishing and aquaculture
Other mining and quarrying
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and
analysis
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
Telecommunications
Information service activities
Accommodation
Human health activities
nsurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory
social security
Motion picture, video and tv programme production, sound
recording and music publishing activities
Other professional, scientific and technical activities
Scientific research and development
Services to buildings and landscape activities
Construction of buildings
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
Water collection, treatment and supply
N/A
Water, Energy and Construction 
Services 
Primary Sector 
Manufacturing 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Total Cost (million euro) 70 0.15 32.04 3.11 4.96
Duration (months 70 12 96 37.1 15.61
Table 1. Descriptive parameters of project’s duration and total cost 
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Graph 4. Eureka’s Impact Overview 
 
In the case of size of R&D undertaken for 
Eureka projects in comparison to general R&D 
projects developed by the companies, descrip-
tive statistics indicate that the Spanish compa-
nies included in the sample are usually famil-
iar with R&D projects – 66% consider their 
participation in Eureka smaller or comparable 
to other R&D activities they have. Nonethe-
less, 23% of firms believe Eureka represents a 
bigger R&D opportunity for them.  
 
When turning to specific constructs of techno-
logical achievements (Graph 5) a clear idea of 
why the overview of technological achieve-
ments is so positive: six out of twelve con-
structs have relatively high rates of achieve-
ment by the companies – especially the ac-
quirement of new knowledge and skills which  
is obtained by 62.3% of the respondents. Not- 
 
withstanding, one would expect a higher rela-
tionship between new and improved products 
and patents – which does not occur and only 
7.8% of firms reported having patents as a 
result of their participation in Eureka while 
46.8% informed the achievement of new prod-
ucts and improved products. Another interest-
ing aspect of this analysis is that the genera-
tion of new strategic alliances is rather low 
(11.7% of companies) in a context of the reali-
zation of cooperative R&D projects – appar-
ently the relationship between firms is prone 
to be specific to the goals proposed for the 
Eureka Initiative. Further analyses regarding 
the relationship between Initial Objectives 
(IOs), Achievements and Expected Achieve-
ments can be found in section 6.3 Identifica-
tion of Associations where some correlation 
analyses of these interactions aiming at assess-
ing Eureka’s outcomes are developed.  
 
Graph 5. Detailed Technological Achievements Overview 
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Industrial exploitation results are quite atten-
tion-grabbing (Graph 6). We have pointed 
before the results of commercial achievements 
and one would expect some relationship with 
the capacity of firms to exploit their techno-
logical industrially. But this seems not to be     
-Industrial exploitation results are quite atten-
tion-grabbing (Graph 6). We have pointed 
before the results of commercial achievements 
and one would expect some relationship with 
the capacity of firms to exploit their techno-
logical industrially. But this seems not to be 
the case since 63 participants (81.8%) reported 
that they were apt of exploiting results in their 
respective industry (16 also mentioned – 
20.7% - the case of industrial exploitation by 
another company). What can explain this fea-
ture might be the rate of firms with products 
already on the market – 45.4% - which is 
closer to the rate of positive evaluations of 
commercial impact as a result of the compa-
nies’ participation in Eureka. It can be also 
seen in Graph 6 the employment impact of 
Eureka in Spanish Companies – apparently the 
participation in this program has a rather posi-
tive employment outcome.  
 
As the main benefits companies see as having  
the Eureka Label five stand out: the prestige of 
the label (75.3% of the sample), improved 
access to resources (58.4%), non-bureaucratic 
procedures (54.5%), being close to market 
(54.5%) and providing funding opportunities 
(50.6%). Fascinatingly this is in perfect accor-
dance with Eureka’s main characteristics and 
proposals described in section 4. As a result of 
these perceptions, 87% of companies included 
in the sample affirmed their interest in partici-
pating in another Eureka project.  
Regarding the main obstacles faced by compa-
nies, it is not surprising that technical difficul-
ties appear as the most often reported obstacle 
(49.4% of respondents) – when dealing with 
innovation and technological progress, techni-
cal matters usually represent a relevant barrier. 
Change in partners strategies (28.6%) also 
come out as an important obstacle for Spanish 
companies participating in Eureka – again, this 
is expected since the initiative promotes coop-
erative R&D projects and this sort of problem 
is a risk inherent to the process.  Also, public 
funding of companies’ participation is men-
tioned by 26% of the sample as a relevant ob-
stacle, which poses some weakness on 
Eureka’s signalling capabilities.  
 
As the last part of this descriptive analysis we 
offer table 1, which brings a comparison be-
tween main results of Spanish companies and 
the total of participants in Eureka across 
Europe – results from the Eureka Annual Re-
port 2006. 
 
First, some limitations should be regarded: a) 
the period of analysis of Eureka’s report is 
2001-2005; b) the results are provided for the 
total of participants and not only firms – this 
was overcame with the combination of de-
tailed results provided in the report expect for 
the case of Technological Achievements since 
this aspect only had aggregated results. Fur-
thermore, not all of the variables were avail-
able at the report so the extension of the com-
parison was limited. Therefore we recommend 
that the analysis of table 2 should have a sug-
gestive character only.  
Graph 6. Industrial Exploitation and Employment Impact results 
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Graph 7. Main Benefits and Obstacles 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison between Spanish Firms and Total of Participants in Eureka 
 
Aspect TOTAL SPAIN 
Composition SMEs 63% 62% 
 Large Companies 37% 38% 
Overall Techno-
logical Achieve-
ments 
Excellent 19% 24,7% 
 Good 62% 67,5% 
 Weak 9% 7,8% 
 Bad 2% - 
 No answer 8% - 
Technological 
Achievements - 
total participants 
New Products 36% 47% 
 Improved Products 32% 47% 
 New Processes 34% 38% 
 Improved Processes 27% 42% 
 Prototype/demonstrator 43% 44% 
 New services 11% 18% 
 New strategic alliances 19% 12% 
 New licenses 3% 4% 
 New Patents 10% 8% 
Technological 
Achievements - 
expected within 3 
years - total par-
ticipants 
New Products 24% 20% 
 Improved Products 10% 7% 
 New Processes 13% 13% 
 Improved Processes 8% 10% 
 Prototype/demonstrator 5% 4% 
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 New services 10% 9% 
 New strategic alliances 10% 12% 
 New licenses 4% 5% 
 New Patents 7% 5% 
     
Industrial Exploita-
tion 
No industrial exploitation  22% 18% 
Already on market Results already on market 31% 46% 
Actual Commercial 
Impact 
Excellent 6% 11,7% 
 Good 42% 41,6% 
 Weak 20% 19,5% 
 Bad 4% 2,6% 
 Nil 17% 15,6% 
 No answers 10% 9,1% 
 Employment Im-
pact 
Increase  34% 44% 
 
The composition of groups seems to be rather 
similar which might indicate a trend in the 
size of companies participating in Eureka. The 
overall technological achievements construct 
provide information that Spanish companies 
either perform better than the European aver-
age or have a more optimistic view of their 
technological accomplishments.  This better 
perception of technological achievements by 
Spanish companies can also be noticed in the 
comparison of individual constructs (except 
for New Strategic Alliances and Patents). 
When assessing the technological results ex-
pected within three years, however, Spain’s 
firms do not seem to have a relevant difference 
with the European average.  
 
Spanish firms apparently have also a higher 
rate of industrial exploitation in the compari-
son with the total of participants in Europe 
and introduce products to the market by the 
date of completion of the project more often. 
The commercial impact also seems to be sig-
nificantly better, especially for those that con-
sider the outcomes as being excellent. Lastly, it 
should be noticed that the employment impact 
of Eureka in Spanish firms has a higher impact 
than in the aggregated analysis of European 
firms.  
 
6.2 IDENTIFICATION OF ASSOCIATIONS 
 
The first approach developed in this section 
uses correlation coefficients to approximate 
the rate of technological success of Eureka in 
Spanish companies. For this we have analyzed 
the companies’ Initial Objectives and how they 
relate to Achievements and Expected 
Achievements for every technological con-
struct. Beforehand, however, it is important to 
notice that the results should be regarded care-
fully. While high correlations might provide 
indications of a sounding technological suc-
cess as a result of companies’ participation in 
Eureka, they may also have a statistical and a 
practical alternative explanations. 
 
The statistical explanation is somewhat obvi-
ous. A high correlation between objectives and 
achievements could represent the lack of both 
– the companies did not intend on achieving 
results in a given construct and so they did 
not. Fortunately the descriptive statistics sec-
tion provides some helpful information for this 
analysis.  
 
The practical explanation has already been 
discussed to some extent previously in this 
paper and it concerns the very definition of 
innovation. Not to repeat all of the arguments 
once again, let’s just say that a high rate of 
technological achievements according to pre-
vious plans might suggest that the advances 
cannot be considered actual innovations.  
 
Turning to the actual results (Table 3) it can 
be seen that five out of the 12 constructs show 
relatively high correlation coefficients between 
Initial Objectives (IOs) and Achieved Results – 
Improvements to Existing Products (0.692), 
Improvements to Existing Processes (0.761), 
Demonstrators, prototypes or pilot phases 
(0.710), Improved management/quality of 
work (0.671) and New Services (0.651). New 
Products (0.519), New Processes (0.595), New 
Licenses (0.557), New Patents (0.457), Publi-
 24
N ew  P rodu ct s Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .5 1 9 ** 0 .1 0 7
Im p ro vemen t s  t o  ex ist in g  P rodu ct s Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .6 9 2 ** 0 .1 1 4
N ew  P ro cesses Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .5 9 5 ** 0 .3 8 0 **
Im p ro vemen t s  t o  ex ist in g  p ro cesses Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .7 6 1 ** 0 .1 9 6
Demon st ra to r s, p ro to typ es  o r  p ilo t  
pha se Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .7 1 0 ** 0 .1 0 8
N ew  licen ses Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .5 5 7 ** 0 .2 0 8
N ew  pa ten t s Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .4 5 7 ** 0 .1 4 9
Pub lica t io n s Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .5 6 1 ** 0 .2 8 6 *
Im p ro ved /n ew  know ledge  o r  skills Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .5 6 4 ** 0 .1 0 9
Im p ro ved  managemen t / qua lit y  o f  w o rk Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .6 7 1 ** 0 .3 6 6 **
N ew  (o r  im p ro ved )  St ra t eg ic  In du st r ia l 
A llia n ces Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .2 9 4 ** 0 .2 9 4 **
N ew  ser v ices Ac h ieved Exp ec ted
In i t ia l  Ob jec t i ve 0 .6 5 1 ** 0 .2 0 2
*  Co rre la t io n  i s  s ign i fi c a n t  a t  th e  0 .0 5  l e ve l
**  Co rre la t io n  i s  s ign i fi c a n t  a t  th e  0 .0 1  l e ve l
cations (0.561) and Improved Knowledge or 
Skills (0.564) show rather moderate correla-
tions between IOs and Achievements. Lastly, 
New (or improved) Strategic Industrial Alli-
ances has a quite low correlation between 
these two variables.  
 
On the other hand, however, all of the con-
structs show low correlation coefficients be-
tween IOs and Expected Results – except for 
New Processes which has a moderate coeffi-
cient (0.380).  
 
These results provide some hints on the out-
comes of companies participating in the 
Eureka Initiative. Apparently there is a good 
rate of achievements according to planned 
goals. Nonetheless, in some cases it is evident 
that IOs are not achieved but results occur to 
companies which did not intend a priori to 
reach some specific goals. One clear example 
is the New Products construct. Even though 
36 companies reported achievements in this 
construct (out of 43 that reported it as an IO), 
the correlation coefficient between IOs and 
Achievements is only moderate (0.519). Ana-
lyzing the database it can be seen that 13 com-
panies that reported New Products as an IO 
did not achieve these results by the end of the  
project and 6 companies that did not have 
developing a new product as an original plan 
did in fact achieve it.  
 
One other interesting particularity of this 
analysis concerns New (or improved) Strategic 
Industrial Alliances. First of all, the number of 
companies that reported this as an IO is rather 
low (17 participants) when one thinks about 
the structure of Eureka that promotes joint 
R&D projects between companies. This aspect 
of the analysis reveals a trend amongst Spanish 
companies of having a one-time relationship in 
order to achieve specific goals instead of de-
veloping long term technological cooperation.  
 
Regarding the expected results the simple de-
scriptive analysis (Graph 5 on page 25) already 
made it pretty clear that Spanish companies 
participating in Eureka do not foresee many 
possibilities of technological achievements 
related to the specific project in the future 
after its completion. This trend can also be 
identified using the correlation coefficients 
presented and it might validate the point of 
view offered for the generation of lasting rela-
tionships with R&D partners: if the goals in-
tended are project-specific, once it is termi-
nated, no remaining goals or inter-firm col-
laboration can take place.   
Table 3. Technological Achievements’ Correlation coefficients 
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Table 4. Cross-tabs controlled for company size 
 Variable 2 Chi-Square Sig.  Main Significant Results 
Technological 
Achievements 0.774 - 
Industrial Exploi-
tation by the 
respondent's 
company 
0.292 - 
Industrial Exploi-
tation by another 
company 
0.552 - 
Product Already 
on Market 0.577 - 
Commercial 
Achievements 0.096* 
Good and Excellent results are related to 
SMEs; Poorer results are related to Large 
Companies.  
Future Impact in 
Turnover 0.187 - 
Employment 
Increase 0.072* Positive Impact is associated with SMEs.  
Company Size 
Employment 
Decrease 0.434 - 
 
* Difference is significant at a 0.10 level. 
 
Following the analysis we develop a series of 
tables that show associations (cross-tabs and 
chi-square) between a set of descriptive vari-
ables and impact variables. The first results are 
shown in table 4 and report the relationship 
between companies’ size and a set of variables 
representing results obtained by the companies 
from their participation in the project. For the 
first part of this analysis, results show that the 
size of the companies (SMEs or Large Compa-
nies) have an association with Commercial 
Achievements and Employment Increase. For 
the commercial achievements, SMEs seem to  
show a greater commercial impact as a result 
of their participation in the project than Large 
Companies. Also, SMEs show a greater level of 
employment increase as an impact of Eureka.  
 
When analyzing the association of results of 
the participation in the initiative with compa-
nies’ sectors, it can be noticed (table 5) that 
only commercial achievements show a statisti-
cally significant relationship. Regarding this 
result, Manufacturing and Services firms 
achieve a better performance. 
Table 5. Cross-tabs controlled for Broad Sector of activity 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi-Square Sig.  Main Significant Results 
Technological 
Achievements 0.858 - 
Industrial Exploi-
tation by the 
respondent's 
company 
0.917 - 
Industrial Exploi-
tation by another 
company 
0.151 - 
Product Already 
on Market 0.758 - 
Commercial 
Achievements 0.048** 
Good and Excellent results are associated with 
Manufacturing and Services firms. Poorer 
results are related to Water, Energy and Con-
struction sector. 
Future Impact in 
Turnover 0.861 - 
Employment 
Increase 0.449 - 
Broad Sector 
Employment 
Decrease 0.943 - 
**Difference is significant at a 0.05 level.  
 
 26
Table 6. Cross-tabs controlled for Role (as Main or Partner) 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Chi-Square Sig.  Main Significant Results 
Technological Achieve-
ments 0.288 - 
Industrial Exploitation by 
the respondent's com-
pany 
0.195 - 
Industrial Exploitation by 
another company 0.160 - 
Product Already on Mar-
ket 0.542 - 
Commercial Achieve-
ments 0.518 - 
Future Impact in Turnover 0.113 - 
Employment Increase 0.160 - 
Role (Main or 
Partner) 
Employment Decrease 0.460 - 
 
 
Table 6 brings the results of the analysis that 
takes the role of companies as a Main player or 
as a Partner in the project as the descriptive 
aspect of the evaluation of the impact vari-
ables. In this case no statistically significant 
result could be found, indicating that this 
characteristic of participants does not seem to 
influence their outcomes (at least not in the 
specific case analyzed).  
 
Table 7 repeats the approach contained in the 
previous tables and analyzes the companies’ 
Role in the Project (as Producer, End User, 
Supplier, Research, Other or Multiple Roles)  
together with the participations’ results. In this 
case, Technological Achievements appear to be 
related to companies’ characteristics – Excel-
lent achievements are obtained by firms play-
ing the role of Producer; Good achievements 
are related to both Producers and companies 
that have Multiple roles in the project; and the 
poorest results can be associated with those 
companies that report having Other roles in 
the project (which might be an indication of 
smaller participation in Eureka). Also, it was 
found a significant relationship for firms that 
participate as End Users associated to Indus-
trial Exploitation by Another Company.  
Table 7. Cross-tabs controlled for Role in the Project 
Variable 1 Variable 2 
Chi-Square 
Sig.  Main Significant Results 
Technological Achieve-
ments 0.073* 
Excellent Technological Achievements 
are associated with Producers; Good 
Technological results are associated 
with both Producers and participants 
with Multiple Roles. Poorest results are 
related to Other roles.  
Industrial Exploitation by 
the respondent's company 0.422 - 
Industrial Exploitation by 
another company 0.038** 
Positive exploitation by other companies 
is associated mainly with the role End 
user.  
Product Already on Market 0.762 - 
Commercial Achievements 0.106 - 
Future Impact in Turnover 0.769 - 
Employment Increase 0.195 - 
Role in 
the Pro-
ject 
Employment Decrease 0.651 - 
        
* Difference is significant at a 0.10 level.  
**Difference is significant at a 0.05 level.  
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6.3 DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS  
 
We start this section with the analysis of re-
sults related to the Discriminant Models built. 
As mentioned in the methodological steps, the 
first stage concerns the identification of dis-
criminatory variables regarding companies’ 
technological achievements. A summary of the 
results obtained is presented in table 8. The 
exploratory nature of this approach led the 
analysis to use a stepwise method – which 
suggested that a one-function model is ade-
quate for explaining the variance in the de-
pendent variable. As it can be noticed, only 
one variable was included – Functioning of the 
Project.  
 
It is interesting to see that the variable Func-
tioning, performs a unitary influence on Tech-
nological Achievements for the sample ana-
lyzed in a model that predicts correctly 71.40% 
of cases. In terms of evaluation of the Eureka 
Initiative in the Spanish case this result is quite 
valuable and, in spite of its obvious limita-
tions, it should be regarded carefully in the 
future. 
 
Furthermore, the relevance of the variable 
Functioning of the Project allows for the con-
clusion that projects that are undertake in the 
better environments, facing less problems, are 
more prone of resulting in the achievement of 
technological results.  
 
The following approach takes Commercial 
Achievements as the dependent variable in the 
analysis, building a model that allows under-
standing better what influences companies 
economic outcomes from their participation in 
the Eureka Initiative. Like the first discrimi-
nant model, this one also was built according 
to a stepwise methodology that suggested two 
functions and two explanatory variables (table 
9 presents a summary of the results).  Unfor-
tunately this model is not quite as robust for 
the sample as the first one as it is capable of 
classifying correctly only 55.7% of cases. This 
might be an indication of the more complex 
situation that commercial results face in com-
parison to purely technical achievements.  
 
Again, Functioning of the Project was included 
in the analysis, but it has a rather low coeffi-
cient in both functions, which suggests its role 
as a catalyst of commercial achievements. 
Nonetheless, the Industrial Exploitation by the 
respondent’s company was not only included 
in the discriminant model but also shows high 
coefficients in both functions. This aspect 
makes perfect sense when one remembers that 
this approach is specifically directed to com-
mercial results – it is hard to think that the 
Table 8. Discriminant model 1: Technological Achievements as dependent variable 
Percentage of Variance 
Explained by Functions 
Significance of 
Functions
Standardized 
Canonical 
Discriminant 
Function 1 Function 1 Function 1
71.40%
100% 0.000
1.000
Variables included in 
the model
Percentage of Cases 
Correctly Classified
Functioning
 
 
Table 9. Discriminant model 2: Commercial Achievements as dependent variable 
Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2 Function 1 Function 2
0.069Functioning 0.044
55.7%
Industrial Exploitation by the 
respondent's company
1.004 1.005
Variables included in the 
model
Percentage of Variance Explained 
by Functions  Significance of Functions
Standardized Canonical 
Discriminant Function Coefficients
Percentage of Cases 
Correctly Classified
75.70% 24.30% 0.000 0.001
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market exploitation of the project’s results 
would not have a significant importance in 
this context. We remind that firms’ techno-
logical achievements were also included in this 
analysis – but excluded from the final model – 
and they do not seem to have a representative 
influence in companies’ commercial impact 
(which can be regarded as a fairly interesting 
result of this analysis). The absence of the 
variable Product Already on the Market can 
also be considering rather surprising in this 
context.  
 
6.4 TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPANTS 
 
In this last part of this assessment of Spanish 
companies’ participation in the Eureka initia-
tive for projects completed in the period 2000-
2005, an attempt of developing an exploratory 
typology of firms included in the sample is 
performed. As it has been already mentioned 
in the methodological section, the set of vari-
ables used to define the characteristics of the 
clusters are Companies’ Size (Large company 
or SME), Role (as Main player or Partner), 
Role in the Project (Producer, End User, Sup-
plier, Research, Other or Multiple Roles), 
Overall Technological Achievements, Func-
tioning of the Project, Industrial Exploitation 
by the Company, Product Already on the Mar-
ket and Commercial Achievements.  
 
Table 10 brings a summary of the structure of 
the clusters built based on a TwoStep Cluster 
approach. One first aspect that has to be com-
mented is that the outcome of the analysis 
suggested the division of cases in 3 clusters 
with rather similar sizes. Nonetheless, it is 
evident that some of the variables used in the 
classification do not necessarily perform a 
considerable separation between clusters as it 
can be seen in the composition of clusters and 
also through chi-square results for the vari-
ables. Results were kept in the original struc-
ture since this assessment has exploratory in-
terests (and the cluster analysis itself is not an 
exact science).  
 
As results show, the size of companies does 
not correspond to a good separation variable 
between clusters – Cluster 1 and 3 both have a 
similar structure and no particular cluster cor-
respond to the set of Large Companies – which 
are divided in small groups within clusters. A 
very comparable situation is provided by the 
Role as Main player or Partner – in this case, 
both clusters 1 and 3 are predominantly com-
posed by Main players, while cluster 2 shows 
no defined characteristic in this sense. These 
observations are supported by chi-square tests 
that do not provide either variable with a sig-
nificant classification power.  
 
The cluster analysis starts taking shape when 
considering Role in the Project as a separation 
variable. In this case each cluster has a clear 
predominance of each one of the three most 
common roles played by Spanish companies 
participating in Eureka for the period ana-
lyzed. Cluster 1 is mainly composed by Pro-
ducers; Cluster 2 by End Users; and Cluster 3 
by companies playing multiple roles. Nonethe-
less, chi-square results do not allow for an 
inferential confirmation of these patterns so 
Role in the Project performs as a rather sug-
gestive variable instead of a confirmatory one.  
 
Following this variable, Technological 
Achievements seem to provide some interest-
ing level of discrimination between clusters: 
while Cluster 1 is mainly made of companies 
with excellent results, both Clusters 2 and 3 
show companies with good technological re-
sults – this should be no surprise since 92,2% 
of the sample classified their technological 
achievements as either excellent (24,7%) or 
good (67,5%), but cluster 2 also shows the 
presence of weak technological results, which 
does not happen for either of the two other 
clusters. In this regard, the chi-square coeffi-
cient indicates that this variable represents a 
good classification aspect between groups. 
Functioning of the project, a variable that 
deals with internal aspects of management of 
the project, does well in separating cluster 1 
from 2 and 3 in a similar manner to that gen-
erated by Technological Achievements (even 
though chi-square results show a good fit for 
this variable only for clusters 1 and 3).  
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Table 9. Results of the TwoStep Cluster analysis 
Cluster Distribution       
  
Cluster 1 – Risky 
Innovators 
28 observations 
(36.4%)   
  
Cluster 2 – Inven-
tors 
26 observations 
(33.8%)   
  
Cluster 3 – Consis-
tent Innovators 
23 observations 
(29.9%)   
  Missing 0 observations   
        
Cluster Profile       
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Size (Large or SME) 
Predominance of 
SMEs (70% of 
cases) 
No predominance 
(50% of cases are 
SMEs and 50% are 
Large Companies) 
Moderate Predomi-
nance of SMEs 
(70% of cases) 
Role (Main or Partner) 
Predominance of 
Main players (80% 
of cases) 
No predominance 
(50% of cases are 
Main Players and 
50% are Partners) 
Moderate Predomi-
nance of Main play-
ers (65% of cases) 
Role in the Project 
Predominance of 
Producers (40%) 
and End Users 
(30%) 
Predominance of 
End Users (35% of 
cases) and firms 
with Multiple Roles 
(30%).  
Predominance of 
companies with 
Multiple roles (50%) 
and Producers 
(40%).  
Technological 
Achievements 
Excellent Techno-
logical Results (65% 
of cases)* 
Good Technological 
Results (80%) and 
Weak Technological 
Results (20%)* 
Good Technological 
Results (100%)* 
Functioning of the Pro-
ject 
Functioning of the 
project rated as 
Excellent (60% of 
cases) or Good 
(nearly 40%).* 
Functioning of the 
project rated as 
Good (60% of 
cases) or Weak 
(25% of cases).  
Functioning of the 
project rated as 
Good (100%). * 
Industrial Exploitation 
by the Company Yes (95%) No (55%)* Yes (95%) 
Product Already on the 
Market Yes (70%)* No (100%)* Yes (65%) 
Commercial Achieve-
ments 
Excellent Commer-
cial Results (30%), 
Good Commercial 
Results (20%), 
Weak Commercial 
Results (20%), Nil 
Commercial results 
(5%)* 
Nil Commercial Re-
sults (40% of 
cases), Weak re-
sults (35%)* 
Good Commercial 
Results (100%)* 
*Clusterwise Importance (chi-quare at 95% confid.) 
 
Regarding Industrial Exploitation of results, 
Clusters 1 and 3 represent groups of compa-
nies that do have some level of exploitation, 
and Cluster 2 seems to be composed by both 
companies that exploit their project outcomes 
and those firms that do not (chi-square tests 
show a significance only for the latter case). A 
clearer division is provided by the variable 
Product Already on the Market: both Clusters 
1 and 3 have the characteristic of having 
commercial activities already by the end of the 
project which does not happen with Cluster 2 
(chi-square significant for groups 1 and 2). 
Lastly, the variable Commercial Achievements 
shows that Cluster 1 represents companies 
with a myriad of different results: while it is 
the only group containing firms with excellent 
results, it also comprehends companies with 
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good commercial results, weak commercial 
results and even nil commercial outcomes. 
This structure is rather complicated to analyze 
as there is no definite pattern (Excellent and 
Good results only account for 50% of cases). 
Cluster 2 is composed mainly by those firms 
with weak and nil commercial outcomes and 
Cluster 3 is related to those with good com-
mercial achievements.  
 
Focusing in those aspects that successfully 
divide clusters, the results indicate a general 
structure according to the following cluster 
profile: 
 
1. Cluster 1 – Risky Innovators - SMEs 
which participate in the project as Main Play-
ers, playing the role of Producers or End Us-
ers, that achieve excellent technological results 
through an excellent functioning of the pro-
ject, exploit their results in the industry, have 
products being commercialized by the end of 
the project and this generates excellent com-
mercial achievements for a group of companies 
comprehended in this cluster. The name of 
this cluster makes reference to the fact that 
companies comprehended in it have the best 
technical outcomes out of the three clusters, 
but only partially they can obtain satisfactory 
market results.   
 
2. Cluster 2 – Inventors - Large Companies 
and SMEs that play Multiple roles or the role 
of End Users in the project, that achieve good 
technological results through a good or weak 
functioning of the project, that do not neces-
sarily perform industrial exploitation of re-
sults, that are not commercializing the out-
comes of the project by the time of its comple-
tion, thus having nil and weak commercial 
achievements. These companies are classified 
as inventors for showing fair technical results 
without taking advantage of it in the market – 
which does not allow us to define them as 
innovators per se.   
 
3. Cluster 3 – Consistent Innovators - SMEs 
which participate in the project as Main Play-
ers, playing Multiple roles or the role of pro-
ducer in the project, that achieve good techno-
logical results through a good functioning of 
the project, exploit their results in the indus-
try,  have products being commercialized by 
the end of the project and this generates good 
commercial achievements.  These companies 
have poorer technical results than the risky 
innovators, but truth of the matter is that they 
consistently achieve good commercial results.  
An interesting exercise is to compare results of 
previous analyses to these presented for the 
cluster approach. Since this is an exploratory 
view of the situation, other statistical tests may 
help in providing it with robustness. Firstly, it 
was shown in the cross-tabs analysis that bet-
ter commercial results were significantly re-
lated to SMEs while poorer results seemed to 
be linked to Large Companies. This is sup-
ported in the cluster structure for while Clus-
ters 1 and 3 are predominantly composed by 
SMEs and have excellent and good commercial 
outcomes, Cluster 2 has no predominance of 
company size (indicating a larger presence of 
Large Companies than in the other clusters) 
and shows poorer commercial achievements.  
 
In the same sense, it has been argued before 
that Producers were related to excellent Tech-
nological Achievements (which is consistent 
with cluster 1) and companies playing multi-
ple roles were related to good technological 
results (consistent with cluster 3).  In this 
scope cluster 2 cannot be justified.  
 
Turning to the discriminant analysis, in the 
second model (commercial achievements as 
dependent variable) functioning of the project 
seems to influence the perception towards 
overall commercial outcomes which is par-
tially supported by the clusters: while Cluster 
1 represents companies with an excellent func-
tioning of the project, Cluster 3 rates both the 
functioning of the project and technological 
achievements as good; Cluster 2, which shows 
the poorest functioning of the project rate 
shows worse commercial results.. Also in the 
second discriminant model, Industrial Exploi-
tation of results is a significant variable of 
separation for commercial achievements, 
which is supported by the structure of the 3 
clusters (even though chi-square tests only 
support the relevance of this variable for Clus-
ter 2). 
 
One last aspect of this analysis concerns a 
quite obvious result according to theory, but 
that deserves some attention. Spanish compa-
nies participating in Eureka for the period 
2000-2005 are mostly well satisfied with their 
technological attainments, which is an impor-
tant aspect of the evaluation of any techno-
logical initiative. However, this is only part of 
the story: the companies’ capacity of introduc-
ing their results in the market and exploiting 
the technical outcomes of the project clearly 
influence the point of view towards commer-
cial achievements – and when dealing with an 
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innovation-driven approach (and not inven-
tion-driven), this latter part of the analysis is 
the one that matters the most.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
Technological policy evaluation is a process of 
utmost importance in any economic context 
that aims at fostering economic growth 
through technological progress and innova-
tion. This is an exercise of constructive criti-
cism with the ultimate goal of providing in-
formation and feedback that allow the con-
tinuous improvement of any kind of initiative 
– private, governmental or even supranational.  
 
The work developed and presented in this 
paper represents an effort in this sense. An 
exhaustive quantitative appreciation of a data-
base composed by Spanish companies partici-
pating in the Eureka Initiative with projects 
finished in the period 2000-2005 made possi-
ble some interesting exploratory insights about 
not only the participants analyzed, but also on 
specific internal aspects of the program that 
must be thoroughly regarded if the intention is 
for Eureka to achieve ever increasing rates of 
success.   
 
The methodology used in the analysis reported 
in this paper had an obvious quantitative char-
acter aiming at taking the step beyond purely 
descriptive analysis. Obviously, in a first mo-
ment, the description of the sample was con-
sidered relevant for the reason of establishing 
the background for further developments. It 
could be noticed that Spanish companies par-
ticipating in Eureka are mainly SMEs in com-
parison to Large Companies, which might 
suggest that these firms are more prone to 
engage in long-distance R&D collaboration, 
which makes sense considering their lower 
capacity of internalizing the development of 
technologies that become more and more 
complex. However, an analysis controlling for 
the participation of each type of organization 
in the whole economy would be necessary to 
confirm this point of view.   
 
In general, it could also be noticed that Span-
ish companies show a better appreciation of 
the outcomes from their participation in 
Eureka than the aggregated figure for the 
whole set of participants. This can be related 
to the profile of Spain’s innovation system – 
since the country lags behind technological 
and innovation leaders, it would be expected 
that players from this nation would benefit 
more (as it would also be the case for coun-
tries in similar positions) from international 
cooperation than a more advanced nation. 
Again, this is a speculation and the confirma-
tion of this idea would have to be through 
research and some inferential analysis based 
on existing data. 
 
Another remarkable aspect shown in the de-
scriptive analysis is related to firms’ perception 
of Eureka’s benefits. It is surprising the perfect 
coupling between what is reported by partici-
pants and the advantages the program claims 
to offer. It must be highlighted though that the 
most important feature for most participants is 
the image of the Eureka label, i.e., the quality 
information that it transmits to the market and 
funding institutions21, acting as an important 
signalling device that reduces adverse selection 
– and this shall be especially important for 
small companies competing for financing op-
portunities of uncertain innovation projects. 
 
But how uncertain are these projects devel-
oped by Eureka companies? We have seen that 
the overall rate of technological achievements 
is amazingly high and even the commercial 
achievements can be considered outstanding 
in a context of innovation. While this might 
indicate that Eureka is doing a really good job 
in selecting potentially successful projects, it 
might also suggest that companies may not be 
taking the level of risk necessary for introduc-
ing major relevant innovations in the market, 
which corresponds to Georghiou’s (2001) 
criticism, already presented in this article, that 
the quality of Eureka’s innovation projects 
seem to be diminishing over time. Or it could 
also mean that the questionnaires are failing in 
capturing the real complexity involved in the 
process (Georghiou, 1997) or are simply influ-
enced by too optimistic respondents.  
 
A fairly robust cluster structure was presented 
for the sample, dividing participants in 3 
groups. This step also allowed for the confir-
mation of the idea that commercial achieve-
ments are strongly affected by the insertion of 
results in the market before or by the end of 
the project. In this sense, Clusters 1 could be 
classified as risky innovators. One interesting 
aspect of this group in particular is that it 
seems to perform better than the other clusters 
                                                 
21 It is important noticing, though, that Public Funding appears 
as one of the most relevant barriers according to Spanish firm’s 
perceptions.  
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except for the case of commercial results, 
which shows a very heterogeneous pattern. 
Cluster 2 represents companies with poor 
market performance by the end of the project 
(for the specific results related to Eureka) but 
with satisfactory technical results, therefore 
Inventors, and Cluster 3 would be composed 
by moderately successful companies or consis-
tent innovators. Cluster results also showed 
that both technological (marginally) and com-
mercial (significantly) achievements are quite 
strong separation variables for groups of firms 
within the sample. Crossing this analysis with 
other Eureka samples (from different periods 
and territories) can be an interesting exercise 
for future validation of a Eureka-wide typology 
of participants.  
 
The results of the discriminant analysis per-
formed also showed that companies’ inherent 
characteristics such as size, sector or role 
played in the project do not seem to influence 
largely the impacts of firms’ participation in 
the initiative. As a matter of fact, what was 
gathered was that the quality of the project’s 
functioning and the capacity of firms exploit-
ing their results in the industry seems to de-
termine the ultimate measure of success: the 
actual commercial achievements. Notwith-
standing, this perspective is rather limited 
because it considers only the situation when 
the project is completed and it is recognized 
that potential effects as results of the projects 
may take a considerable time to become evi-
dent (Georghiou, 1997). Nonetheless, one 
cannot help but noticing a certain level of 
overlapping between the cluster structure and 
the discriminant analysis, since both ap-
proaches suggest the importance of the vari-
ables Functioning of the Project and Industrial 
Exploitation by the Respondents’ Company as 
ultimate factor of success, i.e., the commercial 
achievements realized by Spanish firms. It also 
becomes evident that concern should be given 
to the process of project management 
throughout its realization: the quality of its 
functioning is a significant variable in every 
aspect analyzed in this paper regarding firms’ 
outcomes.   
 
But again, these results can be misleading if 
one considers the potential impacts that might 
unravel in the future. As pointed out in this 
paper, studies show that most likely perform-
ance impacts originated from Eureka have a 1 
year lag between project completion and the 
achievement of actual improvements. Unfor-
tunately this approach cannot be confirmed 
with the data analyzed here, since it is based 
on reports provided at the moment when the 
project is finished. Notwithstanding, compa-
nies’ perception on achieved impacts and ex-
pected impacts for the future are statistically 
related - as the chi-square test showed, com-
panies with better rates of commercial achieve-
ments by the end of the project expect better 
impacts in the future. A joint analysis of this 
outcome and Bayona-Sáez & García-Marco’s 
(2010) can be interpreted as complementary 
rather than antagonistic: even though firms 
have a lag between project completion and 
performance improvements, those firms that 
already achieve some level of success by the 
end of the project seem to achieve better per-
formances in the future than those firms that 
have poorer results when the Eureka project is 
finished. This proposition implies that time 
lags in actual performance may exist, but the 
latter is directly related to attainments reached 
during the project development period.  
 
Efforts in the sense of continuously evaluating 
the Spanish participation in Eureka have to be 
performed in order to complement and even 
provide a different perspective than the one 
presented in this paper, which has a purely 
exploratory character. Nonetheless, the results 
achieved are quite insightful and do well in 
offering an assessment of Spain’s participation 
in Eureka. The Spanish Economy still has a 
long way to go in technological and innovative 
areas of economic activity – contributions in 
this sense are fundamental in order to find the 
right path (which usually is very nation-
specific). In this sense, future research should 
be directed to a combination of data contained 
in both Eureka’s reports and objective eco-
nomic data available at the micro level. Struc-
tural equation modeling based on the Crépon, 
Duguet and Mairesse (1998) framework can be 
developed for this case and provide more ro-
bust and inferential information regarding 
these matters. Also, comparing innovation 
impacts between different technological initia-
tives would result in even more relevant 
knowledge regarding policy evaluation.  
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Appendix I. Variables of Analysis 
 
a. Descriptive Variables 
Variable  Description 
Sample Com-
position 
    
  BroadSector Companies´ Broad Sector of activity (Manufactures, 
Primary Sector, Services and Water, Energy and 
Construction) 
  NACE_Rev2_2digit Companies´ Broad Sector according to NACE 2 digit 
Rev. 2 
  Large Definition of the company as a Large Company (1 if 
Large; 0 if SME). SME is understood as a company 
having less than 250 employees.  
  SME Definition of the company as a SME (1 if SME; 0 if 
Large Company). SME is understood as a company 
having less than 250 employees.  
  Size Classification according to number of employees (0 
to 49; 50 to 99; 100 to 199; 200 to 500 and more 
than 500). It provides more detailed information 
about the size of the company.  
Status of Parti-
cipation 
    
  Main Definition of the company as main player in the pro-
ject 
  Partner Definition of the company as partner in the project  
  ROL_TOT Definition of companies’ role in the project as Pro-
ducer, End User, Supplier, Research, Other or Mul-
tiple roles) 
 TOTAL_COST Project Total cost of the project in million €. 
 
 DURATION permonths Duration of the project in months.  
  FUNCTIONING Rating of the functioning of the project team 
(1=excellent; 2=good; 3=weak; 4= bad) 
 
 39
b. Impact Variables 
Variable  Description 
Technological 
Achievements 
    
 ACHIEVEMENTS Overall technological achievements (1=excellent; 
2=good; 3=weak; 4=bad) 
  IO_NEWPROD Initial objective New Product 
  AC_NEWPROD Achieved New product 
  EX_NEWPROD Expected New product 
  IO_improv_NEWPROD Initial objective Improvement to existing products 
  AC_improv_NEWPROD Achieved Improvement to existing products 
  EX_improv_NEWPROD Expected Improvement to existing products 
  IO_NEWPROCESS Initial objective New processes 
  AC_NEWPROCESS Achieved New processes 
  EX_NEWPROCESS Expected New processes 
  IO_improv_NEWPROCESS Initial objective Improvements to existing proc-
esses 
  AC_improv_NEWPROCESS Achieved Improvements to existing processes 
  EX_improv_NEWPROCESS Expected Improvements to existing processes 
  IO_DEMO Initial Objective Demonstrators, prototypes or pilot 
phase 
  AC_DEMO Achieved Demonstrators, prototypes or pilot 
phases 
  EX_DEMO Expected Demonstrators, prototypes or pilot 
phases 
  IO_LICENCES Initial objective Licenses 
  AC_LICENCES Achieved Licenses 
  EX_LICENCES Expected Licenses 
  IO_PATENTS Initial objective Patents 
  AC_PATENTS Achieved Patents 
  EX_PATENTS Expected Patents 
  IO_PUB Initial Objective Publications 
  AC_PUB Achieved Publications 
  EX_PUB Expected Publications 
  IO_SKILLS Initial objective Improved/New knowledge of skills 
  AC_SKILLS Achieved Improved/New knowledge of skills 
  EX_SKILLS Expected Improved/New knowledge of skills 
  IO_MANAGEMENT Initial objective Improved Management/Quality of 
work 
  AC_MANAGEMENT Achieved Improved Management/Quality of work 
  EX_MANAGEMENT Expected Improved Management/Quality of work 
  IO_ALLIANCES Initial objective New (or improved) strategic indus-
trial alliances 
  AC_ALLIANCES Achieved New (or improved)strategic industrial 
alliances 
  EX_ALLIANCES Expected New (or improved)strategic industrial 
alliances 
  IO_SERVICES Initial objective New services 
  AC_SERVICES Achieved New services 
  EX_SERVICES Expected New services 
Industrial  
Exploitation 
    
  YES_MYCOMPANY Industrial exploitation as a result of the companies´ 
participation in the Eureka project by its own or-
ganization. 
  YES_ANOTHER Industrial exploitation as a result of the companies´ 
participation in the Eureka project by another or-
ganization. 
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  NO No expectations of industrial exploitation as a re-
sult of the participation in this Eureka project.  
  ALREADY_ON Results already on the market 
Commercial 
Impact 
    
  commercial_achiev Rating of overall commercial achievements as a 
result of the project (1=excellent; 2=good; 3=weak; 
4=bad; 5=nil) 
  Future_Impact Impact of project on future turnover (1=very large; 
2=large; 3=medium; 4=small; 5=nil) 
  RD_compare Comparison of the project with other R&D projects 
in the company (1=larger; 2=comparable; 
3=smaller) 
Employment 
Impact 
    
  Increase Employment impact – increase 
  Ac_Increase Achieved increase (FTE) 
  Ex_increase Expected increase - 3 years (FTE) 
  Safeguard Employment impact – safeguard 
  ac_safeguard Achieved safeguard (FTE) 
  ex_safeguard Expected safeguard - 3 years (FTE) 
  Decrease Employment impact-decrease 
  ac_decrease Achieved decrease (FTE) 
  ex_decrease Expected decrease - 3 years (FTE) 
  noeffect No employment effect 
  ac_noeffect Achieved no effect 
  ex_noeffect Expected no effect 
  noinfo No information available 
  out_increase Employment impact outside organization - increase 
  out_increase_num Employment impact outside organization - increase 
– number 
  out_decrease Employment impact outside organization – de-
crease 
  out_decrease_num Employment impact outside organization - de-
crease – number 
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c. Support Variables 
Variable  Description 
Eureka 
Benefits 
    
  supp_partners Assistance from Eureka in finding partners 
  supp_preparation Assistance from Eureka with preparation of proposal 
  supp_opportunities Assisitance from Eureka with funding opportunities 
  supp_running Assistance from Eureka during the running of the pro-
ject 
  supp_after Assistance from Eureka with exploitation after comple-
tion of the project 
  supp_database Assistance from Eureka with database as an informa-
tion tool 
  supp_other Assistance from Eureka with other issues 
  reas_prestige Reason for participation - prestige of Eureka label 
  reas_ressources Reason for participation - improved access  to inter-
nal/external resources 
  reas_broad Reason for participation - broadening of market 
  reas_techn Reason for participation - access to complementary 
technical expertise 
  reas_share Reason for participation - share of risks-costs 
  feat_close Attractive features of Eureka - close to the market 
  feat_procedures Attractive features of Eureka - non-bureaucratic pro-
cedures 
  feat_approach Attractive features of Eureka - bottom-up approach 
  another_part Would you consider participating in another Eureka 
Project? 
Main  
Obstacles 
    
  obs_techn Obstacle - Technical difficulties 
  obs_changes Obstacle - Market changes 
  obs_strategies Obstacle - change in strategies 
  obs_partners_strategies Obstacle - change in partner´s strategies 
  obs_withdraw Obstacle - withdrawal of partners 
  obs_diverg Obstacle - divergence between partners 
  obs_communication Obstacle - communication problems 
  obs_management Obstacle - management of the consortium 
  obs_public Obstacle - public funding of your participation 
  obs_private Obstacle - private financing of your participation 
  obs_synchro Obstacle - lack of synchronisation in the public funding 
of partners 
  obs_legal Obstacle - Legal problems between partners 
  obs_other_legal Other legal problems 
  obs_other Other 
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